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In 2011 at least 1500 migrants perished in the Mediterranean en route to Europe. In one notable 
case 63 of 72 passengers of a refugee dinghy died in the course of a two-week drift. Despite 
communicating distress, they were left to die by passing military vessels and maritime 
authorities. This article analyzes the inquiry into this case conducted within the Council of 
Europe as a revealing instance of international human rights supervision. Through a focus on the 
practice of human rights reporting in instances of multiple institutional and moral failures, it 
shows how the rapporteur arrived at a politically acceptable account of who was responsible for 
the boat’s tragedy. Distinguishing between the concepts of responsibility as duty and 
responsibility as guilt, the article considers the implications of privileging the former over the 
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On the 10th of April, 2011, in Zlitan, a Libyan town situated 160 km east of Tripoli and 60 km 
west of Misrata, a small rubber boat with 11 emaciated people on board washed up on the beach.i 
One woman died immediately upon reaching land, most of the others (nine men and one woman) 
lost consciousness as a result of extreme exhaustion. At the time Libya was in the midst of 
conflict, the coast patrolled by the military. The passengers of the boat were swiftly arrested, 
their possessions confiscated and no medical assistance provided. Another member of the group, 
a man, died during  imprisonment due to the lack of appropriate care.  Eventually, the nine 
remaining survivors bribed their way out of prison and made their way to Tripoli, where they 
received shelter and medical assistance at a Catholic church.  
Thus ended the failed attempt to escape Libya of 72 people who just over two weeks 
earlier embarked upon a risky maritime journey from Tripoli to Lampedusa. Lampedusa is the 
Italian island off the coast of Sicily, notorious for being the first destination for boat migrants 
fleeing North Africa. Tripoli, and the rest of Libya, in the Spring of 2011 became a danger zone 
for sub-Saharan labor migrants caught up in the conflict between pro-government forces and 
anti-government militia. Thousands of men, women and children found themselves in the midst 
of chaos, often facing attacks on the account of being suspected pro-Gaddafi mercenaries. Hence 
the choice of many to attempt the perilous journey across the Mediterranean. Gangs of smugglers 
took advantage of the situation and for steep fees they crammed as many people as possible into 
barely seaworthy vessels, before sending them off into the high seas without provisions or 
adequate navigational aides. Such was the case of the Zlitan boat whose passengers crowded into 
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pack of biscuits between them, set off from Libya with the hope of reaching Italian soil within 24 
hours.  But the sea became rough and after 18 hours of navigation the boat started running out of 
fuel with no land in sight. Set adrift in the middle of the sea, a few days into the journey, one by 
one the passengers started to die. In the end, 63 people in total perished in the course of this 
attempted escape. This number is part of a much larger death toll. According to UNHCR 
estimates, 1500 people lost their lives on the Mediterranean in 2011 and although precise 
numbers are notoriously difficult to establish, hundreds more died since then in maritime 
accidents or of suffocation, hunger and thirst on overcrowded migrant boats.ii Their stories 
remain untold and their deaths unaccounted for. What sets apart the Zlitan boat from other 
similar cases is the fact that owing to the widely publicized testimonies of the nine survivors, the 
knowledge of how the fatal journey unfolded entered the public domain. Theirs is “the story 
[which] gave a face to all these disappeared people.”iii We know that the migrants were not just 
floating in the midst of some maritime equivalent of a desert. NATO had just begun the 
operation “Unified Protector” and the area was teeming with military ships. The migrants saw 
other boats and were seen by their crews. They made contact with persons on land and they sent 
distress signals to other vessels and aircraft who passed them. Documents exist which show that 
their requests for rescue were received and registered by several competent authorities. Had any 
one of these actors followed up on these calls, the lives of the passengers could have been saved. 
Instead the dinghy was left adrift in the middle of the busiest sea in the world, later to become 
known as the “left-to-die boat.”  
Shortly after the British Guardian first published the boat’s story in May of 2011, 
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rights organizations, most prominently the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE). In mid-2011 PACE’s Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons 
nominated the Dutch socialist senator Tineke Strik as its rapporteur to conduct an inquiry into 
the case. The first report was published a year later (PACE 2012). In mid-2013 the rapporteur’s 
mandate was extended and as of this writing further work is ongoing. Based on fieldwork 
conducted at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in the Spring and Summer of 2013 and on a 
study of pertinent documents produced thus far, this essay sets itself the goal of analyzing the 
process of accounting for the “left-to-die” boat disaster. How has the knowledge of what 
happened been generated? What possibilities does it open?  
Beyond highlighting the achievements and limitations of this particular PACE inquiry, 
the point of this case study is to understand more broadly the practice, the politics and the 
potential of human rights inquiry in instances of multiple institutional and moral failures. After 
the harm is done, how do European human rights bodies establish the causes, and when do they 
decide to act in the first place? How is responsibility conceived of and assigned? One key 
question is that of applicable legal frameworks. But the law and the complexities of its possible 
applications are only one part of the story. In assessing the available mechanisms for 
documenting human rights violations in Europe we must pay equal attention to such extra-legal 
factors as institutional and international politics, contested notions of moral duty as well as issues 
of representation and authority (personal as well as institutional). As I show, human rights 
inquiry is a practice wherein ideas of legal, moral and political responsibility are thoroughly 
intertwined. To tease them apart, I offer a discussion of an institutional response to a singular 
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responding to and accounting for the harms suffered by non-citizens caught up in the European 
border regime. Paraphrasing Talal Asad (2000), I ask what can human rights rapporteurs do? 
Ultimately, recalling Elaine Scarry’s work on emergency, I suggest that they have an important 
role to play in developing new models of what she calls “emergency thinking” (2011). That 
mission however must go hand in hand with the pursuit of justice for victims of those 
emergencies where rescue never came.    
 
Responsibility and Human Rights 
As many scholars and practitioners have pointed out, the enduring shortage of effective 
enforcement mechanisms is one among the key reasons why human rights consistently fail to 
deliver on their promise of universality.iv The idea of human rights is about transcending 
boundaries. Citizenship is bounded. Other types of identities are bounded. But human rights were 
conceived of as universal, applicable regardless of one’s nationality, gender and ethnic, racial or 
legal status. Bracketing for the moment the salient question of whether such universality can be 
upheld or defended in world of diversity, inequality and neo-imperialism, let us focus on the fact 
that human rights are meant to operate where the protections of citizenship fail or do not reach. 
Shaped in their modern form by the experience of the Holocaust and mass statelessness, human 
rights are intended as a backup for the domestic systems of rights, a sort of a legal parachute 
which ideally should open in an emergency. Real life situations however, notably those 
involving migrants, regularly test this proposition. As Stefanie Grant has shown, “for much of 
the 60 years after 1948 [the year of the UDHR] migrants were on the margins of human rights 
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sovereignty and national law” (2011: 25, see also Dembour and Kelly 2011). We may think of 
the case of the “left-to-die” boat as an instance of the human rights parachute not opening. 
Existing protections failed and the PACE rapporteur chose to examine the causes through the 
lens of responsibility.v She titled the report Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who is 
responsible?  and organized it as an assessment of multiple failures of several different systems 
and agents that together led to the boat’s abandonment (PACE 2012). Overall, the incident is 
characterized as a “collective failure” and the notion of responsibility is repeatedly invoked. 
These concepts deserve a close focus. What sort of responsibility is at stake? And what exactly is 
a “failure” in a human rights context?   
I shall preface the examination of Strik’s reporting with a more general reflection on 
responsibility, a concept which has received recent careful attention of human rights scholars in 
the special issue of this journal on Humanitarianism and Responsibility (Mitoma & Bystrom 
2013 and others). In the introductory essay Glen Mitoma and Kerry Bystrom show that this 
concept has become a cornerstone of contemporary humanitarianism and call for its “sustained 
interrogation” to uncover and clarify “the various and crosscutting visions of responsibility that 
currently operate within the discussions of humanitarianism carried out by practitioners, policy-
makers, scholars, and a more general public beseeched to respond to humanitarian crises” (2013: 
4). Here, I contribute a reflection on responsibility after the fact. How is it established and 
attributed, and to what effect?  
Responsibility has two conventional senses: the ‘capability of fulfilling an obligation or 
duty’ and the ‘state or fact of being accountable.’ The first sense is anticipatory. It entails 
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may stem from an assignment of duty within a social unit. The second sense is retrospective. To 
be accountable means to be answerable, which entails a relationship: accountability is the 
responsibility of an agent to someone else (Keohane 2002: 1124) or, as recently suggested by 
Goodhart, to specific norms (2011). In a court of law, one can be pronounced responsible for 
having committed an unlawful act or for failing to fulfill an obligation. Such decision has 
traditionally entailed some form of punishment (retribution), the need to make amends 
(reparation), or both (Feinberg 1970: 26). However, philosophers and social scientists who have 
examined the issue have noted that this traditional juridical concept of responsibility is no longer 
stable, that the link between harm and the agent who caused it is being severed (see e.g. Ricoeur 
1995, Kelty 2008). Drawing on Ricoeur, Stan van Hooft notes that today “the management of 
risk through insurance and processes of indemnification has sometimes replaced that of imputing 
responsibility and fault to particular agents. …  A new kind of collective responsibility has 
weakened the imputation of particular fault to particular individuals” (2004). It has therefore 
weakened accountability, or the mechanisms and practical possibilities of holding individuals 
and the bodies they represent to account for their deeds and omissions. This coincides with the 
tendency to implore individuals and groups to be responsible for an open-ended spectrum of acts 
and choices.  
Posited as rational, self-directed subjects, responsible persons are those who are capable 
of grasping their own strengths and weaknesses, anticipating the future and planning for it, 
understanding the consequences of their actions, calculating risk and guarding against adversity. 
In this sense, (personal) responsibility is essentially the highest achievement of that form of self-
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neoliberalism. It has little to do with care of the other, instead it is the ability to administer and 
maximize one’s material and symbolic resources so as to ensure the best possible outcomes for 
oneself and one’s dependants, ideally without enlisting external help. Thus understood, the virtue 
of responsibility has been stripped of its more communal or collectivist aspects and appropriated 
for ideological purposes within contemporary narratives of the autarkic self. This process has 
been termed the ‘responsibilization of subjects’ and critiqued as an element of contemporary 
governmentality (Shamir 2008).  
On the other hand we have the phenomenon of what might be called agentless 
responsibility, strongly associated with Beckian concepts of risk (Beck 1992, 2000). Here, 
contemporary social and cultural anxieties around technological developments, climate change, 
conflict and other forms of risk and insecurity generate calls for responsibility without naming 
the responsible subject (Kelty and McCarthy 2010, Strydom 1999). In this instance duty is 
collective, or societal (Strydom 1999: 67). All of us (including, in no particular order, people, 
corporations and politicians) must be more responsible in how we manage the planet’s resources, 
how we use new technologies, how we do business and how we consume. These exhortations 
apply to everyone and to no one in particular. The moral imperatives may be strong, but when no 
specific agent is designated as the duty-holder, the obligation remains ambient, often contested, 
and ultimately unenforceable. Somewhere in between personal and collective responsibility sits 
the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR), a form of self-regulation which for some 
constitutes the gospel of new socially conscious and responsible business, while to others 
appearing as a ruse designed to boost the public image of corporations and deflect attention from 
































It may seem at first glance that the law should be, to a significant measure, immune to 
these instabilities of responsibility. Obligations and faults may be a matter of political debate and 
cultural contestation. But as H. L. A. Hart has shown, in a court of law, unlike in ordinary 
language, the ascriptions of rights and responsibility, although complex and defeasible, do not 
leave much room for ambiguity (Hart 1949). But not all areas of law are equal in this regard, and 
today a common law court room serves as a poor model for explaining the infinitely complex 
and heterogeneous possibilities afforded by contemporary international legal systems (Merry 
2006, 2010). The concept of responsibility is often invoked in the international legal arena, for 
example in the ongoing work of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (Crawford & 
Olleson 2005) or in the debates around the concept of Responsibility to Protect (Gilligan 2013). 
But as Mitoma and Bystrom have shown, its meaning and place is by no means settled (2013, see 
also Forsythe 2013).   
International human rights law determines the obligations of states towards all 
human beings. But unlike national civil or criminal law, it lacks a unified and universal 
system for adjudicating responsibility when those obligations are broken. The European 
Court of Human Rights, alongside other regional courts (the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights) does provide for 
binding forms of legal decision and has decided landmark cases, but its capacity is 
limited and access to it subjected to multiple conditions (Abdelgawad 2011, Leach 2011). 
With the realization of rights dependent primarily on national judicial institutions, the 
potential of human rights to challenge what Liisa Malkki called “the national order of 
































This does not mean however that the bodies and organizations that together make up the 
global human rights movement are incapable of delivering pronouncements of fault. What it does 
mean is that when such pronouncements are delivered, only rarely do they take the form of a 
binding judicial decision.vii In most places most of the time human rights are monitored at a 
distance by bodies whose role is neither that of law enforcement, nor of prosecution, but of one 
or another form of oversight. Indeed, the entire 20th century history of supranational institutions 
is to a large extent one of establishing what Jane Cowan calls “regimes of supervision” (2007: 
547). She argues that the “historical moment when international society became 
institutionalized” is the moment when in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference the newly founded 
League of Nations assumed a supervisory role over states parties’ compliance with the various 
minority treaties signed in Versailles. “Because details on exactly how the League was to 
‘guarantee’ treaty implementation had been left hazy and because no precedents existed,” writes 
Cowan, “League civil servants, particularly at higher levels, had unusual latitude to define their 
role and their practices” (Cowan 2007: 549).   
From this historical wellspring of international administrative practice emerged most of 
the contemporary quasi-legal ways of assessing human rights abuses, giving rise to a historically 
distinct mode of sovereignty which Cowan terms “the supervised state” (2007). These practices 
include supranational monitoring, special investigations, fact-finding missions, expert reports, 
and other forms of international oversight of human rights whose most prominent effect is that 
they render states’ transgressions known and visible. Within the United Nations, expert inquiry is 
pursued in response to violations of human rights perpetrated by UN member states. Appointing 
































allegations of human rights violations diplomatically, where no direct action is legally possible 
or politically viable. An official rapporteur can call on experts and witnesses to document facts 
pertinent to a specific case or issue, and he or she can disseminate them using the parent 
organization’s platform. Some human rights scholars highlight the distinctive advantages of 
these mechanisms, pointing out for example that the UN’s special rapporteurs “have been 
credited for influencing  significantly the elaboration, interpretation and implementation of 
international human rights law and brought the human rights law work of the UN to the ordinary 
men and women around the globe” (Subedi at al. 2011: 155). Ultimately, without directly 
infringing on national sovereignty, international organizations can expose crimes and pass 
implicit or explicit moral judgment. As Darius Rejali argues in Torture and Democracy, they can 
have the powerful effect of influencing policy through shame and international opprobrium 
(2007). They cannot however compel anyone to make amends or accept punishment, that is to 
engage in acts which are at heart of responsibility as a juridical concept (Ricoeur 1995: 11).  
 
A matter of conscience 
 “NATO units left 61 migrants to die of hunger and thirst” read the front page headline in 
the paper edition of the Guardian on May 8, 2011. We read that “despite alarms being raised 
with the Italian coastguard and the boat making contact with a military helicopter and a warship, 
no rescue effort was attempted” (Shenker 2011). Further, the story gives details of the identities 
of the migrants (they were Ethiopians, Nigerians, Sudanese, Ghanaians and Eritreans of both 
sexes and varying ages, the youngest one year old) and of the key points in their harrowing 
































Shenker recounts how the migrants used the boat’s satellite phone to call a priest, Father Zerai, 
who was their contact in Rome and who in turn alerted the Italian coast guard to the boat’s 
distress.  He reports that they were seen by a helicopter which according to the survivors had the 
word ARMY spelled out on its side, and which lowered some water and biscuits into their vessel, 
but then left without a trace. Shenker established that subsequently they were trying to 
communicate with a military plane taking off from a nearby aircraft carrier by holding two 
starving babies over their heads. Reporting on the fact that most passengers eventually 
succumbed to hunger and thirst, he explains that “the Guardian has made extensive inquiries to 
ascertain the identity of the aircraft carrier, and has concluded that it is likely to have been the 
French ship Charles de Gaulle, which was operating in the Mediterranean on those dates” 
(Shenker 2011).viii Preliminary blame was laid at the feet of the military, implicating not just the 
French commander of one vessel but also NATO forces more broadly.    
 Unusually for migrant boat disasters placed on the front page, the article attracted a great 
deal of attention. That migrant journeys are perilous and often end in death would not have come 
as a surprise to the average consumer of European media, but the story of protracted drift and of 
unanswered calls for help was powerful and its context significant. Operation “Unified 
Protector” was under way, ostensibly launched to protect Libyan civilians from the fallout of the 
conflict between Gaddafi and rebel forces.ix  The Guardian’s allegations undermined this 
narrative of benevolence. NATO firmly demanded a correction, denying that their units were 
involved. x A number of human rights organizations such as Migreurop and the International 
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) also followed up on the case. The most high-level response 
































published, the President of the Parliamentary Assembly, Mevlüt Çavusoglu issued a statement 
calling for an inquiry. “If this grave accusation is true” said the President,  
 
that, despite the alarm being raised, and despite the fact that this boat, fleeing Libya, had 
been located by armed forces operating in the Mediterranean, no attempt was made to 
rescue the 72 passengers aboard, then it is a dark day for Europe as a whole. … I call for 
an immediate and comprehensive inquiry into the circumstances of the deaths of the 61 
people who perished, including babies, children and women who – one by one – died of 
starvation and thirst while Europe looked on.xi 
 
By framing the call in this manner, the PACE president referenced a larger European history and 
narrative of responding to harm, one where coming to the rescue of the dying and the suffering is 
an undisputed moral imperative which nevertheless at certain points in history has eluded 
Europeans. The specter of “Europe looking on” as women and children die is a key rhetorical 
trope in the European human rights discourse, a warning derived primarily from narratives of 
indifference and bystanders’ guilt during the Holocaust. That large-scale abdication of 
responsibility in the future had to be prevented by legal and institutional means was an intuition 
that informed the creation of the European human rights machinery. The founders sketched out a 
vision for the Council of Europe, especially its Parliamentary Assembly as “the conscience of 
Europe” (Adenauer, cited in Kleinsorge 2010). It encompasses keeping a watchful eye on the 
human rights situation in member states by means of a range of oversight procedures, one of 
































on specific issues within the aim and scope of the Council (Evans & Silk 2013).xii Equally, this 
vision implies the need to raise public alarm in cases of apparent indifference vis-à-vis those 
instances of harm where member states can be considered at fault. The imperative to examine the 
case of the boat stemmed directly from this conception of the Parliamentary Assembly’s role. 
The report produced as a result reflects the contradictions inherent in the very idea of a collective 
conscience.  
 
A Room with a View 
The Parliamentary Assembly  brings together parliamentary delegations of all of its 47 
member states and it meets four times a year in Strasbourg for week-long Part-Sessions (four 
Part-Sessions make up one Annual Session). Over 300 parliamentarians meet in thematic 
committees, political groups and plenaries to discuss urgent issues related to the functioning of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law (for example, in the first half of 2013, the issues on 
PACE’s agenda included the situation in Syria and the resulting refugee crisis, the threats to 
democracy in Hungary, the reform of the European Court of Human Rights and the human rights 
responsibilities of Frontex, the European Union’s external border agency). The hub of this 
quarterly activity is the Palais de l'Europe, a fortress-like square building with the shell-shaped 
dome of the hemicycle in the middle. Designed by Henri Bernard to replace the more modest 
Maison de l’Europe, the current headquarters were inaugurated in 1977. The building dominated 
the European District in Strasbourg until the 1999 launch of the Louise Weiss building, the 
official seat of the European Parliament which today dwarfs its neighbors with its distinctive 
































architectural symbolism is the area’s third prominent edifice, the 1994 European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) building located on the bank of the Ille, with its two circular chambers designed 
to resemble the scales of justice.    
I explored the neighborhood intermittently in the spring and summer of 2013, when I 
came to Strasbourg to attend the meetings of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and 
Displaced Persons scheduled during the Part-Sessions, and to speak, among others, with Senator 
Strik, who at the time was seeking an extension of her mandate as the left-to-die boat rapporteur 
(granted in early June). In addition to asking questions of the parliamentarians and civil servants, 
taking in the meetings and collecting documents circulating among the PACE members, I studied 
the material environment wherein the elite discourse on human rights takes shape, noting that the 
uses of space in and around the buildings reflect some of the tensions of European human rights.  
For example, stepping off the silent modern tram at the Droits de l’Homme stop on Allée 
de la Robertsau one can turn left and find oneself in front of the European Court of Human 
Rights or make a right, walk across the Canal de la Marne au Rhin and another 200 meters 
towards the steps leading up to the front entrance of the Palais de l'Europe. Regardless of the 
way one chooses to go, one element of the surroundings is difficult to miss. Along the banks of 
the canal, on both sides of Avenue de l’Europe sits a handful of tents pitched by applicants to the 
ECtHR who in this way manifest their  disgruntlement, impatience and disappointment with the 
official mechanisms of justice. On accusatory placards taped to the tents and attached to nearby 
railings they announce that they will camp there until justice is served, even though their cases 
may already have been declared inadmissible. Men and women in business attire pass the tents 
































consensus: that these people had problems which are “not of legal nature,” and neither the Court 
nor anyone else at the Council is in a position to help them. The Court, write Kelly and Dembour 
“is unfortunately not equipped to ease the pain of all those who had invested their hopes in 
human rights law” (2007: 1). One way to manifest the endurance of such hopes is to refuse to 
leave even after the case is closed. Camping is a metaphor, a powerful device in the 
contemporary language of protest as occupation. Pitching a tent means asserting rights, 
demanding attention through dogged presence in a space that is ostensibly public, but which, as 
the fate of the Occupy movement has shown, ultimately is revealed as belonging to anyone but 
the protesters.    
Nor are European institutions able or inclined to highlight and address the grievances of 
all of the communities and groups which claim that their rights are trampled upon by the 
authorities of CoE member states. Further on the other side of the canal, the sidewalk adjacent to 
the Parc de l’Orangerie opposite Palais de l'Europe is the site of repeated manifestations by the 
Freedom for Abdullah Öcalan movement. They gather during the Part-Sessions to display 
banners (Nous sommes en veille permanente jusq’á la liberation d’ A. Öcalan), distribute flyers 
and collect signatures under petitions to free the Kurdish leader and other political prisoners in 
Turkey. I was told that at times their protests have become disruptive. All I saw however was 
peaceful solicitation by men draped in Kurdish flags and wearing T-shirts bearing the image of 
Öcalan’s mustached face, embodying the pathos of a long-standing cause. Despite the  sympathy 
they can count on within the United European Left (the leftmost of PACE’s political groups), the 
Kurdish issue rarely reaches the plenaries in the hemicycle, blocked by larger interests and 
































Who demonstrates and for which cause changes with the seasons. In April, past the 
Öcalan protesters, right in front of the park entrance a Georgian painter staged a lone protest 
against Russia’s policies in the Caucasus. Along the park fence he displayed twenty-odd oil 
paintings symbolically depicting Russian aggression.  On one, a monstrous two-faced head 
combined the visage of Putin on one side and of Stalin on the other. On another, a growling bear 
in a sheep’s skin trampled upon a map of Georgia clutching a grenade in its paws. A swastika 
composed of army boots was rendered against the background of the white, blue and red Russian 
flag. The painter welcomed anyone who came up to look at the paintings with a warm smile, 
thanking for the attention. The art was not for sale, he said in his rudimentary English, it was to 
tell “the truth about Russia.”   
“We are said to be the conscience of Europe” said to me a Polish member of PACE and 
of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, when I asked him how the 
committee sets its priorities, “and everyone has a dirty conscience from time to time.” Neither an 
answer to my question, nor an explanation of anything, the statement nevertheless captures 
neatly the fundamental paradox inherent in supranational human rights supervision. Those who 
make up the institutions whose prerogative it is to supervise the observance of human rights 
treaties are themselves representatives of nation-states who are usually the last instance deciding 
whether a grievance is legitimate or not.xiv Save for the 1,500 or so applications per year which 
do reach the judgment stage at the Strasbourg tribunal, most claims against state authorities, both 
the severe ones and those seemingly banal, never become the topic of discussions in the 
chambers of the Court (Dembour 2011, Çali 2007). The discussions in the meeting rooms of the 
































they lead to formal censure of a state. The question of whose conscience is dirtier, who ought to 
be shamed and made to repent is ultimately one not of law but of politics. Every intervention on 
behalf of any group of sufferers, much as it might be expressed in the language of rights, is a 
political act in competition with other such acts, motivated by different conceptions of rights, 
violations and fault. The stakes in this competition are multiple, and vary depending on the 
situation. Members of the Assembly are elected representatives in national parliaments whose 
domestic agendas influence their CoE work. For some, the vindication of their position may be 
equally or more important than progress in a human rights cause that they support. The 
parliamentarians have a habit of glancing out the windows of the Committee meeting rooms 
toward the scales-like building of the Court visible on the other side of the street, as if 
referencing some ultimate source of justice. Most human rights matters in Europe could in theory 
be decided at the ECtHR. In practice, few ever will, but the proximity of the last instance lends 
the debates in the Council additional gravity. 
 This was the case on the 25th of June of 2013, when Senator Strik, already set to pursue 
her continued inquiry into the case of the boat, convened a hearing at the Migration Committee. 
She invited Abu Kurke, who is one of the survivors, along with a panel of legal experts. 
Introduced by Strik, Kurke, who currently lives as a refugee in the Netherlands, spoke to twenty-
odd parliamentarians of the initial phase of his escape (prior to boarding the dinghy), the 
beginning of the boat’s journey and the attempts to make contact with Rome. He mentioned the 
helicopter sighting and his desire for justice before being thanked for his contribution to the 
hearing. Well accustomed to giving this testimony (to reporters, to the filmmaker Emiliano Bos, 
































probability significantly buoyed by the presence of the lawyers representing him in the case.xv 
One of them was Gonzalo Boye, the Spanish human rights lawyer who acquired wider fame for 
attempting to use Spanish law to charge members of the Bush administration for their 
participation in war crimes against citizens or residents of Spain who were held in US 
extrajudicial detention (Simons 2009).xvi He was asked to speak because in the aftermath of 
Strik’s first report in mid-2012 the fate of the boat’s passengers has become the subject of two 
criminal lawsuits, in Spain and in France. Boye is the lead lawyer in a criminal case against the 
captain of the Spanish frigate Méndez Núñez and others who may be responsible in the case 
(similar cases have also been filed in Italy and France).xvii In his statement, he described the 
boat’s abandonment as a war crime, discussed the lawsuit filed in the National Court of Spain 
and outlined the possible further course of action: 
 
If the Spanish judicial process doesn’t work, at the end of the day we will end up for sure 
here in Strasbourg, [points out the window at the Court building] at the European Court 
of Human Rights ... [T]he real problem of this case is  that there are witnesses. A case 
without witness is not a case and we don’t know how many cases apart from this we have 
been ignoring because our armed forces haven’t given us sufficient information. And just 
one more question: what would have happened if in that boat would have escaped 
Gaddafi instead of him [points to Abu Kurke]. For sure the helicopters and the boats 
would have gone and would have taken the people of board. As they were African 


































 Alongside Boye spoke Emiliano Giovine, a legal scholar of the European Commission DG 
Joint Research Centre, who brought in the maritime law perspective.xix He discussed his research 
on such legal controversies pertinent to the case as the question of what constitutes “distress,” 
but also reminded the audience of the fundamental principle of rescue at sea enshrined in 
international custom, the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) and the 1979 Search 
and Rescue Convention (SAR) and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).xx Moreover, the recent Hirsi v. Italy judgment of the Strasbourg tribunal affirmed 
that people rescued at sea must not be pushed back to a country where there is a risk that they 
would be treated in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention.xxi For all its merits, none 
of the legal commentary broached the issue of national and EU borders, or paused on the fact 
that the determination of European states to keep migrants out of their territories renders 
maritime rescue basically an act of subversion. 
 Maritime distress can be included in what Elaine Scarry describes as the category of 
“emergencies where the diminution of injury is at stake” (Scarry 2011: 77). In such instances,  
Scarry argues,  
 
all deliberative habits are directed toward determining how to minimize the injury, not 
whether we ought to minimize the injury. If a fire has broken out in a grain elevator, we 
do not wonder whether to put it out but how to put it out in the most efficient and damage-
































ought to help him start breathing, but only the sequence of acts that will bring his breath 
back. (Scarry 2011: 77-78) 
 
Like administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), whose knowledge and practice, as 
Scarry persuasively argues, ought to be vigorously promoted everywhere, search and rescue at 
sea should have the status of a “serviceable habit” (Scarry 2011: 80). In Scarry’s framework, in 
an emergency, such habit is a thought out and rehearsed in advance set of precautions and 
procedures, with clearly delineated responsibilities vested in particular self-authorizing agents. 
Confronted with an emergency, people equipped with such habit will in most cases undertake 
coherent action, maximizing the chances of the victims’ survival. But there are two key obstacles 
to the formation and practice of such habit: immobilization and incoherence (2011: 79). 
Immobilization is Scarry’s term for the situation where people are incapable of initiating their 
own actions in an emergency and “highly susceptible to following orders imposed by someone 
else” (2011: 14). Incoherent action results from the application of the wrong habit to an 
emergency situation, usually as a result of a lack of a prior effort to anticipate, understand and 
prepare for how a dangerous situation may unfold (2011: 17). In the case of the boat, as Strik’s 
inquiry has shown, we see only vestiges of serviceable habit at work, accompanied by 
immobilization, incoherence and, possibly, elements  of an outright malicious intent.      
 
Who is responsible? 
Prior to the launching of criminal cases in European states, prior to the renewing of 
































first report. It adopted, on April 24, 2012, with 108 votes for, 36 against and 7 abstentions, a 
resolution which made specific recommendations to member States concerning how search and 
rescue operations should be carried out in the future. The resolution also called on NATO to 
“provide a comprehensive reply to the Assembly’s outstanding requests for information” (par. 
14.1). The passing of these documents however was preceded by a debate which starkly revealed 
the tensions between ideas of sovereignty and human rights on the one hand, and different 
conceptions of responsibility (duty vs. guilt) on the other. 
Upon providing general background (the situation on the Mediterranean after the Arab 
Spring), outlining her methodology and recounting the facts of the case (as established based on 
available sources), Strik organizes the reminder of her report as “Seven questions of 
responsibility” (pars. 51-136, emphasis mine). The questions include, firstly, failure in the 
coordination of search and rescue, which the report traces down to the Rome Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Center (MRCC). As the documents and audio records show, the MRCC did 
undertake several steps upon receiving, from Father Zerai, the information about the boat in 
peril. Its location was identified as falling within the Libyan SAR zone. MRCC staff attempted 
and failed to make contact with the boat itself (the migrants’ satellite phone ran out of battery). 
They also sent out a number of messages to vessels in the area, to the Maltese MRCC, to the 
NATO headquarters allied command in Naples, and to Frontex, operating at the time in the 
vicinity of Lampedusa. The report asserts that “the Rome MRCC … kept sending this 
DISTRESS message every four hours for 10 days. Many boats must have therefore received it” 
































other calls for assistance coming from within Italy’s SAR zone (and whose outcome was more 
fortuitous).xxii Nevertheless, no blame is directly attributed to the Rome MRCC.  
Rather, its mistakes are connected to, what the report calls “a void of responsibility” 
(pars. 63-73) created by other failures, such as the second failure, which was the failure of legal 
norms to delimit clearly whose duty was it to conduct a search and rescue operation. In normal 
circumstances, according to the SAR Convention (i.e. they key pertinent instrument of maritime 
law) it would be Libyan authorities, as for the duration of its drift the boat was mostly in their 
waters.xxiii The report found however a legal ambiguity concerning the duty to coordinate and 
conduct a search and rescue when the state does not control its designated SAR zone, as was the 
case with Libya at the time.xxiv 
Third in the “catalogue of failures” was the failure to intervene by a helicopter which 
communicated with the boat’s passengers early in their ordeal, but never returned to help. The 
failure to intervene is ascribed also to at least two separate commercial vessels which crossed the 
boat’s path, and a large military vessel, presumably under NATO command, which passed it 
around day 10 of their journey (par 92-104). Fourth was the failure by NATO to respond to the 
fax from Rome MRCC informing it of the situation of the boat, in spite of the fact that according 
to Strik’s evidence NATO assets were in the area, and thus by law would have been expected to 
react. Of special concern here is the Méndez Núñez, today the object of the criminal case filed in 
Spain (pars. 105-124). The fifth identified failure was the fact that when authorizing the 
intervention in Libya, the UN did not anticipate or plan for the consequences of the Libyan 
conflict, particularly in terms of preparations for a large exodus of refugees (pars. 125-129). The 
































territory. “Even in times of war,” the report asserts, “a State has the responsibility for the safety 
of civilians, be this on land or at sea” (par. 130). Finally, the seventh failure was ascribed to the 
human smugglers who neglected to observe even the most basic safety measures when sending 
the boat off to Lampedusa. This last point deserves additional consideration. The entire business 
of smuggling people across the sea is founded on irresponsibility as the very condition of 
profit.xxv It thrives in conflict. Why then consider the smugglers standard practice a “failure”? 
Are not those in power responsible for combating human smuggling in the first place, and 
addressing the structural problems that create the conditions for this criminal practice to flourish?  
These questions notwithstanding, the inclusion of the responsibility of smugglers into the 
report, although initially puzzling becomes more understandable in light of Assembly politics. 
As the discussion that followed the presentation of the report shows, some Assembly Members 
would like to see all of the responsibility for the deaths in the Mediterranean ascribed to human 
smugglers.xxvi Rather than recognizing the criminal activities of this group as rooted in conflict, 
lawlessness, and poverty, some frame smuggling as the cause of migrant boat disasters. In all 
likelihood, without a nod to such views, the report’s chances of passing would be much 
diminished.  
In the section titled “who is responsible,” the report concludes that the failure was 
collective, “at every step of the way and by all key actors” (pars. 133-149). The faults are not 
ordered hierarchically, although there is admission that some actors’ errors or inaction carried 
more weight than others (Strik writes: “What concerns me most, however, are the allegations that 
the boat was ignored by a helicopter and a military vessel,” par. 134).  Important questions, 
































continuously denies that any of the ships under its command have records of sightings of the 
boat.xxvii The identities of the helicopter that communicated with the boat early in the journey, 
and of the military vessel that saw it ten days into the drift remain officially unconfirmed. 
Follow-up queries directed to NATO and flag states are on the agenda for Senator Strik’s 
renewed mandate, as is research into the extent to which the lessons of the case were learned and 
gaps in responsibilities closed.xxviii What is outside the formal competences of the rapporteur, and 
what the Assembly appears not to be interested in pursuing is responsibility in the retrospective 
sense. The knowledge gathered in the course of the PACE inquiry may, and in all probability 
will assist criminal and civil proceedings before national courts, but no explicit calls for 
accountability are made at the international level. During the presentation of the original findings 
to the PACE plenary session, Strik made a telling comment: “Finding out who was responsible,” 
she said, “is not about wanting to blame someone but about learning lessons for the future.”xxix In 
spite of this disclaimer, in the discussion that followed many speakers voiced their disapproval of 
the findings, precisely on the grounds that in their view the rapporteur did engage in what she 
was not supposed to, that is pointing fingers and naming the guilty.  
 And thus an MP from Malta (displeased with the presentation of the Maltese MRCC as 
implicated in the case) rejected the very framing of the report: 
 
While I acknowledge the depth of the investigations, I beg to differ on their presentation 
and interpretation. The title of the report does not refer explicitly to a particular incident, 
but treats the issue as if all the 1500 deaths during 2011 happened in the same manner. 

































It is significant that the MP twisted Strik’s key phrase (it was Who is responsible? not Who is to 
blame?). At stake for the Assembly Members was precisely the issue of blame implied in the 
double meaning of responsibility. Some praised the report for “not set[ting] out to pillory 
anyone” and for “finding solutions, not blaming people.” Others, notably those representing 
states with direct interest in the case, felt that blame had in fact been apportioned and unfairly so, 
particularly to Malta, Italy and Spain. Statements defending the maritime rescue authorities and 
the militaries of these countries underscored high rates of successful rescue operations and 
rejected any culpability on their part. Speakers sought firstly to portray these actors as 
unconditionally faithful to their international obligations, and secondly to shift the attention to 
the human smugglers and the Gaddafi regime. These defensive reactions show that Strik’s 
inquiry had a “public reputational” effect, which is an important element of all accountability 
mechanisms (Keohane 2002: 1133). The fact that PACE inquiries can cause negative publicity 
only highlights their political nature.   
 As the rapporteur later told me, acknowledging some degree of  
“political thinking,” care went into avoiding direct finger-pointing in the final report. She 
suggested (as did some other rapporteurs I spoke to) that blaming anyone too hard in a report 
makes them feel cornered and defensive. Instead, it is important to “address omissions with 
precision,” although in this case NATO, Italy and Malta all responded defensively, with the latter 
two “eager to show how they cope with pressure at sea.”xxxi As I was able to observe on the 
occasion of other reports under discussion in the Committee of Migration, Refugees and 
































uncontroversial reports, whereas the controversial ones (e.g. where one group may be held 
responsible for the disadvantage of another), may be accused of “bias,” “partiality” and 
“unfairness.”  
 “The rapporteurs are politicians,” I was reminded by a civil servant involved in PACE 
work. “They decide what issues they take on, and how they approach them.” All of Council of 
Europe reports are to some extent political statements, but some Assembly members chose to use 
the rapporteur’s mandate to express controversial or unpopular opinions. For example, a 
parliamentarian may volunteer to investigate an issue of their interest and end up producing a 
document which, deliberately or otherwise, upsets particular national delegations.xxxii In such 
cases the report may never be approved by a committee, but the statement will have been made.  
Strik’s report does not fall in this category. Despite opposition voiced in the discussion, and the 
vigorous pushing of amendments which sought to dilute some of the points of the draft 
resolution, Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea ultimately passed the vote. Likewise, there was 
political support in the Committee for Strik’s continued work on the case. 
Ultimately, the political objective behind both past and present work on the case is to 
supply further facts and bolster the case for implementing the recommendations of the original 
report, especially the creation of “a binding European Union protocol for the Mediterranean 
region,” which would comprehensively “tackle the issue of responsibility sharing, particularly in 
the context of rescue services, disembarkation, administration of asylum requests, setting up 
reception facilities and relocation and resettlement.” As things stand, “the heavy burden placed 

































The left-to-die boat constitutes a case where this reluctance played out to its tragic, but 
predictable conclusion.  Nevertheless, the reactions to the report show that responsibility remains 
elusive. On the one hand, as we can see from the report’s reception in the Assembly that it 
remains identified with blame. This is paradoxical, because while it is unsurprising that no one 
wants to accept any blame, the rapporteur is likewise not eager to cast it. In the report 
responsibility is instead proposed as a duty, one which extends to a range of different actors and 
agencies. On the particular occasion under investigation these responsibilities went unmet, but 
the account stops short of direct attribution of fault. Instead, ample use is made of the concept of 
“failure.”   
Failure, as opposed to a violation or abuse suggests that something just broke down, 
rather than that there is a guilty party, or parties, that could be held to account in a court of law or 
another comparable forum. Such framing is symptomatic of the diplomatic (or, some would say, 
tepid) language characteristic of the quasi-legal human rights discourse. Not wanting to blame 
anybody means that there is no call to punish those responsible, nor a way to demand that they 
provide any kind of compensation to the survivors of the left-to-die boat or the families of the 
dead. There is in other words neither a retributive nor a reparative justice element in the report, 
or for that matter in the rapporteur’s mandate. Instead there is a pedagogy of learning from 
failures and a call to rethink and redistribute responsibility for the lives of vulnerable others. This 
mode of responding to harm is consistent with what Ricoeur calls the shattering of the traditional 
juridical concept of responsibility, that is the reframing of responsibility from an obligation to 
make amends for deeds or omissions already committed, to a future-oriented duty towards 
































Ricoeur is suggesting that in fact responsibility as guilt and responsibility as duty are not 
coeval, but that we are witnessing a historical shift from the former to the latter. He notes that 
“the recent history of what is called the law of responsibility, in the technical sense of the term, 
has tended to make room for the idea of a responsibility without any fault, under the pressure of 
concepts such as solidarity, security and risk, which have tended to take the place of the idea of 
fault. It is as though the depenalization of civil responsibility must also imply a total loss of a 
sense of culpability” (Ricoeur 1995: 25).  This account points towards a progressive diminishing 
of the significance of guilt, but in international human rights law both concepts—fault and 
obligation—are present simultaneously. In fact, juridical responsibility is being strengthened in 
some limited areas, even as the broader human rights movement overwhelmingly relies on the 
idea of responsibility as duty.  Juridical responsibility of states and other subjects of international 
law is triggered by a breach of a specific legal obligation. Since the subjects of international law 
are states, not individuals, traditionally international law has attributed the actions of individuals 
on behalf of state organs exclusively to the state (Nollkaemper 2003, see also Koskenniemi 
2001). Yet this customary understanding is beginning to change. With the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court and a number of international criminal law treaties a limited 
number of human rights violations (genocide, terrorism, torture and certain war crimes) can now 
lead to individual responsibility under international law.  
But to the majority of human rights failures in Europe today, including the left-to-die 
boat, these criteria do not apply, despite the fact that faults can be attributed both to individuals 
and to institutions empowered by states to carry out certain tasks (such as rescue at sea). Some 
































invoke the framework of responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts.xxxiii Efthymios 
Papastavridis shows that flag and coastal states can incur responsibility in two distinct ways. 
Firstly, they can do so for violations of the rules concerning rescue at sea under the law of the 
sea, and secondly for failing to meet obligations under international human rights law 
(Papastavridis 2012). In this case the most obvious breach was of the obligation to provide 
rescue at sea. Francesco Messineo argues also that NATO member states which are also ECHR 
signatories would probably be violating Article 2 (the right to life) and possibly 3 (prohibition of 
torture and degrading or inhuman treatment or punishment) of the European Convention if they 
came into contact with a vessel in distress and let people die of starvation and thirst instead of 
helping them.xxxiv This reasoning, although consistent with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, will 
remain speculative until actual proceedings unfold in national courts. As Gonzalo Boye 
suggested in the passage quoted above, an application to the European Court of Human Rights 
alleging a violation by one or more states of their obligations under the European Convention 
could be a way to pursue a judicial remedy, although formal requirements associated with this 
route could prove difficult.xxxv  
 
Conclusion   
In the face of states guarding their sovereignty and shielding themselves from the 
scrutiny and interventions of the international human rights machinery, the Council of Europe is 
left with the quasi-legal mechanisms of supervision which lack the teeth of legal sanctions, but 
which help develop and advance human rights norms and standards. The Strik inquiry is clearly a 
































enter Europe go unaccounted for. In this instance the PACE process has produced a detailed 
investigation and as comprehensive an account of what happened as the circumstances allowed. 
This has unquestionable value. The defensive responses of Italy, Malta and Spain and other 
parties responsible in “left-to-die” boat case on the other hand present us with nothing more than 
another instance of the state not wanting to be supervised.  
But settling on unenforceable “lessons for the future” as the best and final word that 
institutions like the Council of Europe can give us is unsatisfactory. Thinking with Scarry (2011) 
on emergency, and with Ricoeur (1995) and others on responsibility, opens up some additional 
questions. What is the relationship between emergency and the two facets of responsibility, that 
is duty and blame? When disaster strikes, is it sufficient to know what a particular agent ought to 
be doing in the moment? Does it matter that in the past, someone, somewhere else failed to come 
to rescue? Does guilt play a part in an emergency?  
It does, or such seems to be the answer of the President of PACE who chastised Europe 
for “looking on” as the boat’s passengers were dying. But whose guilt? Surely claiming that 
every single European was at fault would be as preposterous as attributing all blame to only one 
agent. The language of “omissions” and “failures” may be diplomatic, but ultimately it 
perpetuates ideas of collective responsibility, that is obligations distributed so widely that no one 
agent can be held to account. Without a clear naming of those who failed in their duties, it is 
difficult to pinpoint who exactly is responsible for implementing “lessons for the future,” or to 
see how anybody could be held to account if the report’s goals do not materialize. With the 
expansion of the scope of responsibility in time and space and in the context of complex 
































question of ‘who’ becomes impossible to answer” (Kelty 2008: 13). 
Thinking and planning for an emergency (or creating “serviceable habits”) clearly does 
involve developing a clear grasp of one’s obligations, which requires learning from the specifics 
of past mistakes and their tragic outcomes. Those mistakes may involve technical errors such as 
bad communication and poor planning, and ethical lapses, for example the deliberate avoidance 
of duty on the grounds that taking migrants onboard will only invite further problems for the 
crew. I shall now address those two categories of fault.  
Planning to avoid technical errors may be a complex task, but ultimately effective models 
do exist. As Scarry underscores in her discussion of mutual aid contracts, which are one of her 
four models of emergency thinking, a very specific assignment of duty, down to the issue of who 
will bring which tool to the site of a flood or fire is critical to the successful responses to crises, 
as tested in many locations around the world where some form of mutual aid contracts are in 
existence (2011: 34-51). In this regard, the report on the “left-to-die” boat provides a preliminary 
toolkit which could aid reforming the procedures of rescue in the conditions of complexity 
created by maritime migrations on a busy sea of intersecting jurisdictions, legal mandates and 
commercial interests.xxxvi  
The second problem, that is the one of ethical lapses, comes down to question of whose 
survival is at stake. Do we collectively believe that everyone is entitled to a chance at survival, or 
only selected few? “A democracy must guarantee ‘equality of survival’” writes Scarry in her 
discussion of the Swiss shelter system, which she regards as a model of emergency thinking 
where the survival of an entire population is at stake. She points out that the system is based on 
































inhabitants, not just citizens of the country (2011: 52-53). This principle of equality of survival is 
also implicit in the obligation to provide rescue at sea which remains in force regardless of the 
legal status of the victims. It is bolstered by the idea, embraced by the Strasbourg court, that 
human rights do not cease to operate at sea. And yet, as the increasing death toll on the 
Mediterranean shows, practice fails to meet aspiration. This leaves us with the question of 
justice.  
The nine survivors of the left to die boat, as the Strik report notes, “have to live with 
physical or psychological scars from the traumatic trip and build new lives” (par. 156). The 
report acknowledges their pain and appeals to Council of Europe member states that “in view of 
the ordeal of the survivors [states] use their humanitarian discretion to look favorably on any 
claims for asylum or resettlement coming from these persons” (par. 15). (“They are traumatised 
and have experienced more than enough” Strik added in her statement to the PACE plenary.) 
Save for these comments, the Draft Resolution included in the report makes no mention of the 
survivors and the dead. Any form of redress is off the table, as if taboo in the non-confrontational 
discourse of supranational human rights oversight.  
Indeed, delivering justice of any kind is not in the mandate of the Council of Europe and 
that is simply a fact of international relations. Left in the competence of national courts, 
retrospective responsibility may or may not in the end be established in the course of what is set 
to be an arduous legal battle. But the question remains whether human rights oversight could 
bear out an alternative way to frame responsibility that would make room for some concept of 
guilt. In this way it could open the possibility of addressing the harm, thus drawing the ethical 



































This article would not have been written without the generous help of the Secretariat of the 
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. I thank especially Isild Heurtin for her patient support and introducing me to 
the workings of PACE. David Milner and Mark Neville have also lent a helping hand. I am 
deeply grateful to Tineke  Strik and Mikael Cederbratt for sharing insights into their work. I have 
also benefitted from conversations with staff at the Strasbourg Office of the UNHCR. The initial 
draft from which this article emerged was presented at the panel Who’s Responsible? at the 
Biennial Meeting of the European Association of Social Anthropologists in Paris in 2012. I am 
grateful to Thomas Strong for co-organizing it with me and for our early conversations on 
responsibility. Subsequent iterations were presented in 2013 at Oxford University’s COMPAS 
and at the Workshop on Ethnographies of Border Controls at Stockholm University. I thank 
Dace Dzenovska and Ruben Andersson for the invitations. A previous version was also read by 
my colleagues in the Migrancy Research Group at Lancaster University. I am grateful for all the 
feedback. Financial support for fieldwork in Strasbourg was provided by the Department of 
Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University and by Security Lancaster. As ever, my 




































ABDELGAWAD, Elizabeth Lambert, ed. (2011) Preventing and Sanctioning Hindrances to the 
Right of Individual Petition before the European Court of Human Rights. (Antwerp: 
Intersentia). 
ANDERSSON, Ruben. (2012) A Game of Risk. Boat Migration and the Business of Bordering 
Europe. Anthropology Today, 28 (6), 7-11.  
ARENDT, Hannah. (1951) The Origins of Totalitarianism. 2nd enl. ed. (New York: Meridian).  
ASAD, Talal. (2000) What do Human Rights do? An Anthropological Enquiry. Theory and 
Event, 4(4). 
BECK, Ulrich. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. (London: Sage).  
BECK, Ulrich. (2000) Risk Society Revisited. Theory, Politics and Research Programs. In The 
Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory, Barbara Adam, Ulrich Beck, 
Joost Van Loon (eds.) (London: Sage).  
BENHABIB, Seyla. (2004) The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
BENSON, Peter and KIRSCH, Stuart. (2010) Corporate Oxymorons. Dialectical Anthropology, 
34(1), 45-48. 
ÇALI, Basak. (2007) The limits of international justice at the European Court of Human Rights: 
































Social and Legal Perspectives. Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Tobias Kelly (eds.) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
COWAN, Jane K. (2007) The Supervised State. Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 
14, 545-578.  
CRAWFORD, James and OLLESON, Simon. (2005) The Continuing Debate on a UN 
Convention on State Responsibility.’ International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 54,  959-
971. 
ÇUBUKÇU, Ayça. (2013) The Responsibility to Protect: Libya and the Problem of 
Transnational Solidarity. Journal of Human Rights, 12, 1, 40-58.  
DEBONO, Daniela. (2011) ‘Not Our Problem’: Why the Detention of Irregular Migrants Is Not 
Considered a Human Rights Issue in Malta. In Are Human Rights for Migrants? Critical 
Reflections on the Status of Irregular Migrants in Europe and the United States, Marie-
Bénédicte Dembour and Tobias Kelly (eds.) (London and New York: Routledge). 
DEMBOUR, Marie-Bénédicte and KELLY, Tobias. (2011) Introduction. In Are Human Rights 
for Migrants? Critical Reflections on the Status of Irregular Migrants in Europe and the 
United States, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Tobias Kelly (eds.) (London and New York: 
Routledge). 
DEMBOUR, Marie-Bénédicte. (2006) Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on the 
































DEMBOUR, Marie-Bénédicte. (2011) What it takes to have a case: the backstage story of 
Muskhadzhiyeva v. Belgium. In Preventing and Sanctioning Hindrances to the Right of 
Individual Petition before the European Court of Human Rights, Elizabeth Lambert 
Abdelgawad (ed.) (Antwerp: Intersentia). 
EVANS, Paul and SILK, Paul, eds. (2012) The Parliamentary Assembly Practice and 
Procedure, 11th Edition (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing). 
FEINBERG, Joel. (1970) Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
FORSYTHE, David P. (2013) On Contested Concepts: Humanitarianism, Human Rights and the 
Notion of Neutrality. Journal of Human Rights, 12(1), 59-68.  
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AGENCY. (2013) Fundamental Rights at Europe’s Southern Sea 
Borders. (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union).  
GILLIGAN, Emma. (2013) Redefining Humanitarian Intervention. The Historical Challenge of 
R2P. Journal of Human Rights, 12(1), 21-39. 
GOOD, Anthony. (2006) Anthropology and Expertise in the British Asylum Courts (New York 
and London: Routledge). 
GOODHART, Michael. (2011) Democratic Accountability in Global Politics: Norms, not 
































GRANT, Stefanie. (2011) Irregular Migration and Frontier Deaths: Acknowledging a Right to 
Identity. In Are Human Rights for Migrants? Critical Reflections on the Status of Irregular 
Migrants in Europe and the United States, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Tobias Kelly 
(eds.) (London and New York: Routledge).  
HART, H. L. A. (1949) The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, New Series, 49, 171-194.  
HELLER, Charles, PEZZANI, Lorenzo and Situ Studio. (2012) Forensic Oceanography. Report 
on the “Left-to-die Boat.” Centre for Research Architecture, Goldsmiths, University of 
London. 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. (2009) Pushed Back, Pushed Around. Italy’s Forced Return of 
Boat Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers. 
(New York: Human Rights Watch).  
Interights. (2003) Judicial Independence: Law and Practice of Appointments to the European 
Court of Human Rights. (London: Interrights).  
KELLY, Tobias and DEMBOUR, Marie-Bénédicte (2007) Introduction - the social lives of 
international justice. In Paths to International Justice: Social and Legal Perspectives. Marie-
Bénédicte Dembour and Tobias Kelly (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).   
KELTY, Christopher. (2008) Responsibility: McKeon and Ricoeur. ARC Working Paper no. 12. 

































KEOHANE, Robert O. (2002) The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and the Use of 
Force. Michigan Journal of international Law, 24, 1121-1140.   
KLEINSORGE, Tanja. (2010) The Parliamentary Assembly: Europe’s Motor and Conscience. In 
Council of Europe, Tanja E.J. Kleinsorge (ed.) (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International). 
KOSKENNIEMI, Martti. (2001). The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of 
International Law 1870-1960. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).   
MALKKI, Liisa. (1995) Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among 
Hutu Refugees in Tanzania. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).  
MCCARTHY, Elise and KELTY, Christopher. (2010) Responsibility and Nanotechnology. 
Social Studies of Science, 40, 405-432. 
MCCORQUODALE, Robert. (2001) International Law, Boundaries and Imagination. In 
Boundaries and Justice. Diverse Ethical Perspectives. David Miller and Sohail H. Hashmi 
(eds.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
MERRY, Sally Engle. (2006) Anthropology and International Law. Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 35, 99-116.  
MERRY, Sally Engle. (2010) Beyond Compliance: Toward and Anthropological Understanding 
of International Justice. In Mirrors of Justice. Law and Power in the Post-Cold War Era, 
































MITOMA, Glen and BYSTROM, Kerry. (2013). Humanitarianism and Responsibility. Journal 
of Human Rights, 12(1), 1-20.   
MORRIS, Lydia. (2010) Asylum, Welfare and the Cosmopolitan Ideal (Abington: Routledge). 
NOLLKAEMPER, André (2003). Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility and State 
Responsibility in International Law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 52, 615-
640.  
PACE (2012). Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who is responsible? [Online] Available: 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/XRef/X2H-DW-XSL.asp?fileid=18095&lang=en [30 August 
2012].  
PACE. (2013a) Migration and Asylum. Mounting Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
[Online]. Available: http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/XRef/X2H-DW-
XSL.asp?fileid=19349&lang=en [30 August 2013]. 
PACE. (2013b) Frontex. Human Rights Responsibilities. [Online] Available: 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/XRef/X2H-DW-XSL.asp?fileid=19719&lang=en [30 August 
2013].  
PACE. (2013c) Budgets and priorities of the Council of Europe for the biennium 2014-2015. 
[Online] Available: 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=19734&Language=EN [12 

































PAPASTAVRIDIS, Efthymios. (2012). Rescuing Migrants at Sea: The Responsibility of States 
Under International Law. Social Science Research Network. [Online] Available: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1934352 [30 August 2013].  
RAJAK, Dinah. (2011) In Good Company: An Anatomy of Corporate Social Responsibility. 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press). 
REJALI, Darius M. (2007) Torture and democracy. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press).  
RICOEUR, Paul. (1995) The Concept of Responsibility: An Essay in Semantic Analysis. In The 
Just, Paul Ricoeur, David Pellauer (tr.), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).  
SCARRY, Elaine. (2011) Thinking in an Emergency. Amnesty International Series in Global 
Ethics (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company).  
SHAMIR, Ronen. (2008) The age of responsibilization: on market-embedded morality. Economy 
and Society, 37(1), 1-19.  
SHENKER, Jack. (2011, May 8). Aircraft Carrier Left Us to Die, Say Migrants. The Guardian. 
SIMONS, Marlise. (2009, March 28) Spanish Court Weighs Inquiry on Torture for 6 Bush Era 
Officials. The New York Times. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/world/europe/29spain.html [30 August, 2013].  

































SUBEDI, Surya P., WHEATLEY, Steven, MUKHERJEE, Amrita and NGANE, Sylvia. (2011) 
The Role of the Special Rapporteurs of the United Nations Human Rights Council in the 
Development and Promotion of International Human Rights Norms. The International 
Journal of Human Rights, 15(2), 155-161.  
SUNDERLAND, Jason. (2012) Hidden Emergency. Migrant Deaths in the Mediterranean (New 
York: Human Rights Watch). 
VAN HOOFT, Stan. (2004) Ricoeur on Responsibility. Borderlands. E-journal, 3 (1) [Online] 
Available at http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol3no1_2004/vanhooft_ricoeur.htm [6 June 
2012].  
VOETEN, Erik. (2008) The Politics of International Judicial Appointments. Chicago Journal of 
International Law, 9, 387-406.   


































                                               
i The following account is based on factual data collected in PACE 2012, Shenker 2011 and Heller et al. 
2012. See also Sunderland 2012.  
ii According to UNHCR spokesperson, “estimates were based on interviews with migrants who reached 
Europe by boat, telephone and e-mail communication from their relatives, as well as reports from Libya 
and Tunisia from survivors whose boats either sank or were in distress,” see 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41084&#.UiCq8BY70wE, accessed on August 30, 
2013. To the author’s knowledge, no total estimate of migrant deaths at sea has been published for 2012 
or for the first half of 2013.  
iii As described by Tineke Strik, while introducing her report on the case to the Parlimentary assembly of 
the Council of Europe, April 24, 2012 (verbatim record available at www.assembly.coe.int).  
iv The Arendtian theme of “the right to have rights” that is the problem of claiming rights and enforcing 
their protection beyond territorial boundaries of sovereign states runs through much of the 
literature on contemporary European migrations. Human rights transcend citizenship, yet people 
who migrate across national borders experience extraordinary difficulty when it comes to 
receiving the protection they are entitled to through human rights law. At the heart of the 
problem, as Robert McCorquodale observes, is the fact that “the present international legal 
system is so determined to protect the interests of states and their territorial boundaries that any 
people who seek to move across those boundaries are seen as intruders. If they can enter at all, 
they enter at their own risk.” (McCorquodale 2001: 152; see also Arendt 1951, Benhabib 2004, 
Dembour and Kelly 2011, Good 2006, Morris 2010, Weissbrodt 2008). 
v This was not the deadliest such event in 2011. In 2011, the most severe incident took place on 6 April, 
when more than 220 Somali, Eritrean and Ivoirians drowned when their boat capsized 39 miles 
































                                                                                                                                                       
vi For careful ethnographic analyses of CSR see Benson and Kirsch 2010 and Rajak 2011.  
vii The most highly developed international judicial mechanism of human rights enforcement is the 
European Court of Human Rights which hears complaints of violations of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.   
viii The allegation that the ship in question was Charles de Gaulle is denied by the French Ministry of 
Defense (PACE 2012, par. 98) 
ix For a thought-provoking discussion  of the intervention in Libya as a contested instance of the 
application of the Responsibility to Protect principle see Çubukçu 2013.  
x The version of the article currently available online appears under the title “Aircraft carrier left us to die, 
migrants say” and carries the following correction: “This article was amended on 9 May 2011. The 
original version referred throughout to a NATO ship. This has been changed to European units pending 
further clarification.”  See http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/08/nato-ship-libyan-migrants 
accessed June 2, 2012 
xi See http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/NewsManager/EMB_NewsManagerView.asp?ID=6619 accessed 
August 12, 2013 
xii Committees formally appoint rapporteurs who “drive forward any inquiry into matters referred to the 
committee by the Assembly” (Evans and Silk 2012: 308). The rapporteurs do not have any 
special investigatory powers and depend on the good will of national governments and relevant 
authorities for access to information. Their fact-finding missions operate on a restricted budget 
(see PACE 2013c) and involve official letters of inquiry, studying documents, travel to relevant 
sites, and interviews with relevant parties as well as collaboration with experts and NGOs. 
Committee staff assist in the preparation of reports which are then presented to the Assembly for 
debate and adoption. The rapporteurs steer the reports through the process of consideration and 
































                                                                                                                                                       
xiii In 2005 the ECtHR ruled in Öcalan’s favor by declaring that the imposition of death penalty following 
an unfair trial was a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention (Öcalan v. Turkey, 
Application no. 46221/99, 2005).  
xiv This applies to the political institutions, not the European Court where the judges sit in their 
independent capacity and not as representatives of their member states. At the same time the 
procedures for nominating candidates for judicial appointments in many countries have been 
criticized for being highly politicized (see e.g. Interights 2003, Voeten 2008).    
xv To avoid exacerbating the burden of repeated testimony, I decided against interviewing Kurke in 
person. 
xvi Boye’s quest was portrayed in the documentary film The Gunatanamo Trap directed by Thomas 
Wallner (2011).   
xvii See http://www.fidh.org/63-migrants-left-to-die-in-the-mediterranean-survivors-continue-their-13484 
accessed on August 20, 2013 
xviii Transcript of expert statement, “Left-to-die Boat” Hearing, Committee on Migration, Refugees and 
Displaced Persons, PACE, CoE, Strasbourg, June 25, 2013.  
xix The third speaker was Jeanne Warnet of the FIDH Legal Action Group, involved in the “left-to-die” 
boat litigation in France.  
xx I thank Emiliano Giovine for sharing his speaking notes.  
xxi Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application no. 27765/09, 2012. See also Human Rights Watch 2009.   
xxii According to the ROME MRCC, “Between 26 and 28 March, the Italian authorities were engaged in 
incidents involving approximate 4 300 people. Over 2 200 of these people were assisted at sea 
and around 2 000 were rescued from distress situations. From the Rome MRCC’s perspective, 
priority needed to be given to the large number of incidents occurring within Italy’s SAR zone 
































                                                                                                                                                       
xxiii The report by Heller et al. (2012) provides a map showing the trajectory of the drift across the 
territorial waters and SAR zones of Libya, Italy and Malta.  
xxiv As Emiliano Giovine explained to the Committee later, “IMO Guidelines provided further 
clarification and interpretational guidance for exceptional situations like the one of our case in which 
Libyan MRCC, theoretically responsible, was not able to co-ordinate and lead the search and rescue 
operations and could not even stipulate agreements with other rescue centers in order to be replaced 
within its duties. It is in cases like this one that the first MRCC contacted should have then acted taking 
the lead of the operations until another competent authority would have clearly assumed responsibility.” 
Emiliano Giovine, speaking notes, 25 June 2013, on file with author.  
xxv We read that “the smugglers showed reckless disregard for the lives of the migrants. To make money, 
they overloaded the boat, they took away food and water, they did not provide sufficient fuel and 
they did not provide adequate means of communication in case of distress. Furthermore, the so-
called ‘captain’ of the boat was clearly unqualified to get the boat to Lampedusa” (par. 132). But 
given the known predatory and exploitative nature of the people smuggling business, the implied 
expectation that the owners of the boat would somehow concern themselves with safety seems 
misplaced. Other reports on the problem of boat migrations show that such recklessness is 
routine. Boats are overloaded as a matter of course. Water, provisions and spare fuel are left 
behind because they take up space which could otherwise be occupied by a paying passenger. 
Communication devices represent a risk for smugglers who fear being tracked down through 
satellite networks (Sunderland 2012, see also Andersson 2012). 
xxvi See transcript of morning debate on April 24, 2012 available at www.assembly.coe.int under Verbatim 
































                                                                                                                                                       
xxvii The letter from NATO to Senator Strik is available at  
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_03/20120329_120327-letter-NATO-CoE.pdf 
accessed on March 7, 2013 
xxviii The results of the follow up inquiry are due to be presented to the Committee on Migration, Refugees 
and Displaced Persons in April of 2014.  
xxix See transcript of morning debate on April 24, 2012 available at www.assembly.coe.int under Verbatim 
Records. 
xxx Francis Agius, Nationalist Party, Malta. See transcript of morning debate on April 24, 2012 available 
at www.assembly.coe.int under Verbatim Records. For more on maritime migration in Malta see 
Debono 2011.  
xxxi Author’s interview with Senator Tineke Strik, April 23, 2013.   
xxxii For example, I witnessed a heated debate in the Committee around a report in preparation on an 
immigration-related issue, where the rapporteur was accused of unfairly representing a particular 
host country as victimizing a particular group of immigrants.  
xxxiii The relevant international document is the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts. It does not currently have the status of a binding international treaty.    
xxxiv See the blog of the European Journal of International law for a record of an online discussion 
between Papastavridis and Messineo on the case: http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-left-to-die-boat-
whose-responsibility-for-the-death-of-63-migrants-in-the-mediterranean/ accessed on February 
26, 2013.  
xxxv The case brought before the Strasbourg court (a) must be brought by a victim of a violation of one of 
the provisions of the convention; (b) the victim must have exhausted all domestic remedies in 
pursuit of a resolution of the case; (c) the application must not be anonymous; (d) it must not be 
































                                                                                                                                                       
domestic decision (and this limit is now set to be reduced to four months); (f) it must not be 
incompatible with the provisions of the convention or constitute an abuse of the right to 
individual petition. As Dembour points out, these “conditions of admissibility are far from being 
a mere formality: the great majority of applicants are disappointed at the admissibility stage” 
(Dembour 2006).  
xxxvi Other relevant recent documents produced within the Council of Europe include PACE 2013a, PACE 
2013b.  
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